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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.

;

LIVIO ALPHONSO RAMIREZ

:

Case No. 880425

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for Aggravated
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Cods Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1982).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (1982) (Supp.
1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987) (Supp. 1989),
because the conviction is for a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Officer Stuck's initial stop of defendant

was proper as either a voluntary police/citizen encounter or an
investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion.
2.

Whether the showup identification of defendant by

Gerald Wilson was inherently unreliable or the product of any
improper suggestion.

3.

Whether the prosecutor's comments during opening

statement and closing argument prejudiced defendant's right to a
fair trial.
4.

Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at

trial to support the jury verdict.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the
following provisions:
1.

United States Constitution, Amendment IV,

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1982),

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1982),

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982),

5.

Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah

Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (1982),
6.

Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 14, 1987, defendant was charged with
Aggravated Robbery (Record [hereinafter R.] at 7-8). Pretrial
motions were filed by defendant, moving to suppress a showup
identification, claiming the procedures used by the police
officers were unduly suggestive (R. at 49-50).

Defendant also

moved that all evidence obtained by the police officers,
including the showup identification, be suppressed, claiming the
evidence was obtained in violation of defendant's right against
unreasonable searches and seizures (R. at 47-48).

Extensive

testimony on these issues was introduced at three separate
hearings held March 12, 1988; March 18, 1988; and May 31, 1988

(Records 211, 213, and 215). The trial court denied both motions
(R. at 85, 87-88) .
A jury trial was held on July 11-13, 1988, in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding (R. 212 at 10 and
213).

At trial, defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery, a

first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code. Ann. § 76-6-302
(1982) (R. 212 at 284). Defendant was sentenced to a term of
five years to life at the Utah State Penitentiary, but was
granted a stay of the prison sentence and placed on probation for
three years (R. at 177-78).
Following trial, defendant moved for a mistrial and new
trial respectively, claiming remarks by the prosecutor during
opening statement and closing argument were improper (R. at 16364).

Following a hearing on this issue and a renewed motion on

the previous issues, the trial court denied defendant's motion
(R. 172-173).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Citations for this Statement of Facts are to the trial
transcript (R. 212) and to the transcripts of the hearings on the
pretrial motions (R. 213, 211, and 215).
On August 13, 1987, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Kathy
Davis, manager of Pizza Hut located at 782 North Redwood Road,
Salt Lake City, Utah, was leaving the restaurant accompanied by
her husband, John Davis and her brother Gerald Wilson (R. 212 at
26-27).

The parking lot directly adjacent to the Pizza Hut

restaurant was very well lighted by four large perimeter lights,

the Pizza Hut sign, and globe lights that surround the entire
circumference of the building (R. 212 at 31, 84). As the trio
were preparing to enter their car, a man suddenly came running
directly at them, brandishing a metal pipe (R. 212 at 30-31, 62,
84).

As the man (hereinafter pipe robber) approached, he

accosted Kathy Davis, demanding that she give him the bank bag
containing the receipts from the restaurant (R. 212 at 29-30).
Mrs. Davis informed the pipe robber that she did not have the
bank bag.

The pipe robber, visibly upset, insisted that she give

him the money, and violently pushed her into the car (R. 212 at
32).

As she stood up and attempted to move away from the car,

she informed him that the bank bag was in the restaurant.

The

pipe robber then angrily pushed her into the car once again,
yelling, "I want it." (R. 212 at 32).
Meanwhile, Mr. Wilson attempted to restrain the pipe
robber, who consequently struck Mr. Wilson in the stomach with
the butt end of the metal pipe (R. 212 at 84-85, 103). The pipe
robber then ordered Mr. and Mrs. Davis to enter the restaurant,
retrieve the money bag, and return (R. 212 at 33-34, 69, 88).
Nervously, Mrs. Davis entered the restaurant (followed by Mr.
Davis), obtained the money bag containing $369, and returned (R.
212 at 33-36 and 65).
In the interim, Mr. Wilson again attempted to restrain
the pipe robber.

The pipe robber swung the metal pipe, missed

Mr. Wilson, and hit a rain gutter (R. 212 at 87, 104). Mr.
Wilson's attention was at that time drawn to a second man
standing a short distance away holding a gun (hereinafter gun

robber), after the pipe robber instructed "if they move/shoot
them." (R. 212 at 63, 85-86).

Of the three victims, Mr. Wilson

was the only witness able to view the gun robber sufficiently to
later identify him as defendant, Livio Alphonso Ramirez (R. 212
at 56, 64, 91) .
Mr. Wilson testified that defendant was standing
approximately ten feet away and ten feet off the corner of the
building,
crouched down and aiming a gun right at my
head. . . . I was looking at the man with
the gun -- staring at him. . . . Just
getting a good description when the time came
to give it to them, and just about at his
eyes, I just stared at him. . . .[for a]bout
a minute or so.
(R. 212 at 88-89).

Mr. Wilson watched defendant with an

unobstructed view until Mrs. Davis returned with the bank bag, at
which time both defendant and the pipe robber fled the scene (R.
212 at 92) .
The police were summoned to investigate the robbery.
Officer Vida Travis of the Salt Lake City Police Department took
statements from the witnesses.

Officer Travis testified that,

at the scene, Mr. Davis described the pipe robber to Officer
Travis as a male Mexican, eighteen to nineteen years old, sixfoot, slender build, short dark hair and brown eyes, wearing a
white bandana and a red and white baseball cap (R. 212 at 194,

Officer Travis testified at an earlier suppression hearing
that, in refreshing her memory as to what descriptions were given
by the witnesses, she did not use her personal notes, but relied
upon a typed report which may not have included the entire
descriptions given by the witnesses. Officer Travis indicated,
"apparently they've not included everything in it" (R. 215 at 5).

195, R. 215 at 4-5). Also at the scene, Mr. Davis had described
defendant (gun robber) as eighteen to nineteen years old, fivefoot-six, slender build, brown eyes, wearing Levis, a white
bandana over his face, and a red and white cap, and holding a gun
(R. 212 at 195, R. 215 at 4-6). Officer Travis testified that
Mr. Wilson had described the pipe robber as a male Mexican,
twenty-one to twenty-two years old, five-foot-seven to five-footeight, one hundred fifty-five to one hundred sixty pounds, having
shaggy brown hair, brown eyes, with a front tooth missing and a
bald spot on the side of his head, "like a mohawk".

Mr. Wilson

further had indicated that the pipe robber was wearing a blue
sweater, Levis and a white scarf over part of his face (R. 212 at
195, R. 215 at 6-7). Mr. Wilson had described defendant (gun
robber) as a male Mexican, five-foot-nine to six-foot, long
"shaggy hair", wearing a blue cut-off sweatshirt, Levis, and a
white scarf across his face, carrying a gun (R. 212 at 196, R.
213 at 46, R. 215 at 7).
At trial, both Mr. and Mrs. Davis testified that they
didn't see the gun robber well enough to identify him (R. 212 at
34-35, 40, and 63-64).

Mr. Wilson testified at trial that he

studied the gun robber carefully in order to give a description
to the police and he described the gun robber for the jury (R.
212 at 88-91).

Mr. Wilson also testified at trial that defendant

had a tatoo on one arm (R. 212 at 88).
At trial, defendant was shown to be five-foot-ten, one
hundred and sixty-five pound, Apache Indian with Spanish
heritage, with three tattoos on one arm including a rose, an ML"

and a little drummer boy, all of which are visible while wearing
a cut-off sweatshirt (R. 212 at 250-251).

Defendant testified

that when he was arrested he was wearing a sweatshirt, Levis, and
a baseball cap, which he identified as State's Exhibits P-9, P12, and P-ll respectively (R. 212 at 231). Also during trial,
the witnesses identified these same three exhibits as being
similar to or the same as those worn by one of the robbers during
the robbery (R. 212 at 37, 66, 94-95).
After officers took the statements from the witnesses,
a description of the suspects was called into police headquarters
and a dispatch was issued for two male Mexican suspects, at least
one tall and skinny, with no part in the hair, wearing a blue
sweatshirt, Levis, wearing a red and white hat, and white
handkerchief (R. 212 at 201).
Shortly after 1:00 a.m., Salt Lake City Police Officer
Merrill Stuck was cruising in his police car with the headlights
and radio off in an area approximately two to three blocks south
of the Pizza Hut, searching for a runaway juvenile (R. 212 at
151-152, R. 213 at 9). As he drove north up Morton Drive, he
observed two individuals walking southbound down the sidewalk,
side by side, toward him.

Officer Stuck continued to watch the

individuals proceed together for approximately half a block (R.
212 at 153,

R. 213 at 7). Suddenly, at a point where Officer

Stuck believed the individuals recognized his police cruiser, one
of the men took off running.

Officer Stuck could not describe

this person other than he believed it was a male wearing a light
colored shirt (R. 212 at 178-179).

Officer Stuck immediately

turned his radio on and advised the dispatcher that an individual
had just run away upon sighting him, and he had "a pedestrian at
600 North and Morton Drive" (R. 213 at 14). Officer Stuck then
drove to where the remaining individual was standing, exited his
patrol car and asked the individual if he had identification, and
an explanation as to why the other person ran (R. 212 at 156).
Officer Stuck testified at the suppression hearing that the
reason he asked for identification was "the fact that he had been
with another man who ran from me, and at 1:00 o'clock in the
morning in an area that had a very high incidence of nighttime
residential burglary and car prowls"; additionally, he had "taken
several car prowl reports" during that week from nearby apartment
buildings (R. 213 at 8-9).
The individual approached by Officer Stuck had no
identification, but identified himself has Livio Alphonso
Ramirez, the defendant in this case (R. 213 at 21). Defendant
voluntarily cooperated with Officer Stuck, giving not only his
name, but his date of birth and his address (R. 213 at 21).
Defendant claimed that he was neither walking with nor did he
know the man who ran.

Defendant indicated the man who ran was

stocky, wearing black "baggy pants", no shirt, with short black
hair (R. 212 at 245, R. 215 at 21). Defendant further claimed
that he had just been to his "uncle" Joe Montoya or Martinez's
house, and that at the time he was stopped he was walking to warm
himself up to jog due to an asthmatic condition (R. 212 at 72,
159, 189, R. 213 at 11, 25, 35-36).

Officer Stuck testified that prior to the arrival of
Officer Rackley he neither gave orders to, nor came into physical
contact with, defendant.

Further, he did not attempt to move or

handcuff defendant or at any time draw his weapon (R. 213 at 212
22) .
Shortly after Officer Stuck had obtained the identity
of defendant, Officer Robert Rackley arrived at the scene.
Officer Stuck was surprised to see Officer Rackley because
Rackley was outside his regular patrol sector. (R. 212 at 157).
Officer Rackley had received both the dispatch indicating that
the Redwood Road Pizza Hut had been robbed by two males, and also
the call from Officer Stuck that he had observed two individuals
in the area of the robbery, one of which ran upon sighting his
patrol car, and a second who had remained and was about to be
questioned for identification (R. 211 at 6-7, R. 212 at 200-201).
The specific description broadcast by dispatch was of two Mexican
males, one carrying a gun, the other carrying a pipe, last
observed fleeing northbound through the Pizza Hut parking lot
toward Redwood Road (R. 212 at 201). The man with the gun was
described as wearing a blue sweatshirt and Levis, with a dark
complexion, dark hair, and slender build (R. 211 at 15).
Officer Rackley, upon viewing defendant, immediately
indicated that "that guy matches the description of the robbery
suspect that just went down, we better check him for weapons."
(R. 211 at 7). Officer Rackley testified that he believed
2
Although Officer Stuck could not remember asking defendant to
raise his hands when he first approached him, he indicated at a
pretrial hearing that such was possible (R. 213 at 12-13).

defendant's description matched that dispatch broadcast because
defendant "was wearing a cut-off sweatshirt with —

a sweatshirt

without sleeves on it and he was wearing Levis and he was a male
Mexican and he was in the right area.

The place where we stopped

him was about maybe two or three blocks away maximum from the
scene of the robbery (R. 211 at 8)."
Officers Stuck and Rackley then proceeded to search
defendant for weapons and waited for more information to be
dispatched over the radio (R. 211 at 8). Sometime thereafter,
defendant was handcuffed to a fence for extra security while
Officer Stuck proceeded to search the area for the other suspect
(R. 212 at 184-185, 227). Mr. and Mrs. Davis and Mr. Wilson were
then escorted (although it is somewhat unclear in what order they
arrived) to where defendant had been stopped in order to
determine if they could identify him as one of the robbers (R.
212 at 40, 69, R. 213 at 49-50, 59, 61-62, 69). While Mr. and
Mrs. Davis both indicated that they could not make positive
identification (they both testified that they had not had the
opportunity to sufficiently view the gun robber at the time of
the robbery), Mr. Wilson testified he was able to positively
identify defendant as one of the robbers (R. 212 at 40, 69, 91,
94, R. 213 at 51). All three witnesses indicated that the extent
of information the police had proffered to them prior to the
identification, was that the police had located a suspect who fit
the description which they had given (R. 212 at 39, 74, 94, R.
213 at 50, 59, 68-69).

Mr. Wilson further testified that when he

identified the defendant he did not know defendant was handcuffed
to the fence (R. 212 at 94).

After allowing the witnesses the opportunity to
identify defendant, Officers Stuck and Rackley placed defendant
in the patrol car and proceeded to where he claimed his "uncle"
Montoya or Martinez lived, in order to determine whether the
statement he had given was correct (R. 212 at 171-174, R. 213 at
34-39).

The officers discovered that the residence actually

belonged to a man named Ortega who was not defendant's uncle but
actually an uncle to defendant's cousin (R. 212 at 186, 219, R.
213 at 36-37).

Upon returning to the patrol car, Officer Stuck

informed defendant that his story had not panned out (R. 212 at
171, 234). Defendant claimed that his "uncle" was lying (R. 212
at 172, R. 213 at 36). Approximately 15 minutes later, defendant
conceded that he had not been to see his "uncle" but had been out
walking.

Defendant said that he had made the previous false

statement because he believed the officers would not accept the
fact that he had been merely out walking (R. 212 at 172-173, R.
213 at 36).
Defendant's testimony differed considerably from that
of the officer.

Defendant claimed that he had neither changed

stories nor had he made any false statements (R. 212 at 236-237).
Defendant denied that he had indicated the name of his "uncle"
was Montoya or Martinez, insisting that the only name he had
given to police was Ortega (R. 212 at 248). Defendant further
alleged that Officer Stuck was "pissed off" and physically
threatened him on a number of occasions (R. 212 at 232, 234,
249).

Defendant also indicated that he requested to see his

"uncle" when the officers attempted to corroborate his story, but

his request was denied (R. 212 at 234). Finally, defendant
claimed that he had walked through the Pizza Hut parking lot just
prior to being stopped by Officer Stuck, but saw or heard nothing
unusual, except for possibly a fight (R. 212 at 242).
During a search following the robbery, Officers
recovered the metal pipe, a red and white cap and handkerchief.
The cap and handkerchief were behind a Thrifty Drug Store near
the Pizza Hut (R. 212 at 33-37.

The pipe was in "a little

planter box with shrubberies" in the parking lot (R. 212 at 137).
Subsequently, the money bag was located and recovered behind a
neighborhood home, only a short distance from where the robbery
occurred and where defendant was stopped (R. 212 at 140, 150).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Officer Stuck's initial stop of defendant was valid as
either a voluntary police/citizen encounter or as an
investigatory stop supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.
The prosecutor's comments during opening statement and
closing argument were proper, or at most constituted harmless
error, whereby defendant was neither prejudiced or denied a fair
trial.
Mr. Wilson's identification of defendant was the result
of a clear and conscientious observation at the time of the
robbery, and was not the product of any undue influence or
unnecessary suggestion.
The evidence presented at trial, coupled with the
reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the jury's verdict that
defendant committed Aggravated Robbery.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS VALID AS
EITHER A VOLUNTARY POLICE/CITIZEN ENCOUNTER
OR AN INVESTIGATORY STOP SUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION,
Defendant contends that Officer Stuck's initial stop
was made without sufficient reasonable suspicion, therefore
constituting an invalid seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
An issue concerning the existence of reasonable
suspicion and/or probable cause necessarily requires a clear and
concise statement of facts with the precise order in which they
occurred.

In addition, where the evidence is in dispute, the

credibility of the witnesses is of the utmost importance.

In the

present case, defendant's motion to suppress was raised several
different times before, during and after trial.

Prior to trial,

extensive pretrial testimony was introduced over three separate
hearings held March 12, 1988; March 18, 1988; and May 31, 1988
(R. 213, 211, and 215). It is important to note that Officer
This Court has repeatedly indicated that "as a general
rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless
an argument for different analyses under the state and federal
constitutions is briefed." State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247
n.5 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah
1987); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-273 (Utah 1985). Since
defendant has not argued a different analysis between the state
and federal constitutions, this Court should address this issue
on federal constitutional grounds only. Further, this Court has
traditionally construed Article I, Section 14 and the Fourth
Amendment, which textually are nearly identical, as providing the
same scope of protection. See e.g. State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120
(Utah 1976); State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517
(1968).

Stuck and defendant each testified during these hearings and at
trial.

The trial court, after reviewing all the evidence,

including the demeanor of the witnesses, denied defendant's
motion to suppress.
Based on the testimony presented, the initial stop and
questioning by Officer Stuck was justified, either as a brief
voluntary police/citizen encounter, or as an investigatory stop
supported by reasonable suspicion.
This Court has recently cited with approval in State v.
Dietman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Fifth Circuit Court's
delineation of the three levels of police encounters with the
public "which the United States Supreme Court has held are
4
constitutionally permissible." Jki. at 617.
These three levels
are:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
In Dietman, officers responded to a burglar alarm which
sounded at International Video in Salt Lake City. As the
officers arrived they observed a truck pull away from the curb
across the street from the video store. An officer followed the
truck until it stopped a few blocks away. When the individuals
exited the truck the officer asked if he could speak with them.
The individuals voluntarily responded and presented
identification upon request. This Court, in holding the
investigatory stop was constitutionally valid, stated "[t]he
officer was justified in asking defendant for identification and
an explanation of their presence in an area where police had
responded to a burglar alarm. Defendants were not detained
against their will and were not arrested at this time*" Ici. at
618.

the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed.
Id. at 617; see United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 228, 230 (5th
Cir. 1984), cert, denied, Hartsel v. United States, 476 U.S.
1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250, 90 L.Ed.2d 696 (1986).

The State maintains

that defendant's initial stop was acceptable under both levels
(1) and (2).
A.

Police/Citizen Encounter

In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App, 1987),
this Court addressed the issue of when, during a police
encounter, a seizure occurs.

In that case, Trujillo and others

were walking slowly down the street, peering into windows at 3:30
in the morning.

An officer approached them and asked for

identification.

No one tried to flee and all three gave the

officer their correct names.

They explained that they were going

to Trujillo's cousin's house.

The officer frisked Trujillo and

found a knife strapped to his chest.

In determining when and if

Trujillo had been seized, the Court stated:
A seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment occurs only when the officer by
means of physical force or show of authority
has in some way restricted the liberty of a
person. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100
S.Ct. at 1876 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19,
n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, n.16). When a
reasonable person, based on the totality of
the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit
of cooperation with the officer's
investigation, but because he believes he is
not free to leave a seizure occurs. j[d. at
544, 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1870, 1877.
Id. at 87 (footnote omitted).

The Court found insufficient

information in the record to determine whether a seizure occurred

prior to the pat-down search of Trujillo so it "assume[d] that up
to that point no intrusion upon Trujillo's protected rights
occurred."

]ji. at 88.
In the present case, there is conflicting testimony as

to what occurred during the original encounter between Officer
Stuck and defendant.

Officer Stuck testified that, at the time

of the initial stop, he drove up to where defendant was standing,
exited his patrol car and merely inquired whether defendant had
any identification or explanation as to why the other person ran
(R. 212 at 156). Defendant voluntarily cooperated with Officer
Stuck, giving his name, date of birth and his address (R. 213 at
21).

Officer Stuck specifically testified that at no time prior

to the arrival of Officer Rackley did he give orders to, or come
into physical contact with, defendant.

Further, he did not

attempt to move or handcuff defendant, or at any time draw his
weapon (R. 213 at 21-22).5
Defendant claimed that when Officer Stuck exited the
car, "he told me to hold it, and I turned around and he had his
hand on his gun." (R. 212 at 224). Defendant then asked what was
going on (R. 212 at 227). Defendant claimed that Officer Stuck,
without responding to the question, immediately handcuffed him
and backed him up to a fence, where he remained until Officer
Rackley arrived ten minutes later (R. 212 at 227). Defendant

Officer Stuck, when asked if defendant was free to walk
away during the initial encounter, testified, "I suppose if he
had tried to walk away, I don't know if I could have been able to
stop him or not at that point . . . I didn't require him to stay
there. I didn't tell him he had to stay there. The subject
never came up. I cooperated with him" (R. 213 at 12).

also denied that Officer Stuck asked for any information
including identification, indicating H[h]e didn't ask for
nothing" (R. 215 at 12-13).

Defendant testified that, following

Officer Rackley's arrival, a search occurred (R. 212 at 229).
Consequently, a determination of when and whether a
"seizure" or even detention occurred during the initial stop,
must necessarily be based on the credibility of the witnesses'
testimony.

We must assume that the trial court, by denying

defendant's motion to suppress, accepted the testimony of Officer
Stuck over the testimony of defendant.

This Court has repeatedly

indicated that determining the credibility of the witnesses is a
function best left to the trier of fact, and the trier of fact is
entitled to use its own judgment as to the evidence it would
believe, without any obligation to accept as true, defendant's
version of the evidence or his self exculpating statements as to
his intentions and/or his conduct.

See i.e., State v. Frame, 723

P.2d 401 (Utah 1986); State v. Schoenfield, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah
1976); Sullivan v. Turner, 448 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968).
In the instant case, there are numerous reasons why the
trial court or the jury could have reasonably excluded the
testimony of defendant.

First, defendant claimed that he neither

knew, nor had he been walking with, the individual who had ran
after spotting the police cruiser (R. 212 at 181, 213 at 10).
This testimony was inconsistent with Officer Stuck's testimony
that he had observed defendant with the other individual, walking
Defendant claimed that he was not asked for identification
until after Officer Rackley arrived and he was handcuffed to the
fence (R. 215 at 15).

side by side down the sidewalk, for at least a half a block (R.
7
212 at 153, R. 213 at 7).

Second, defendant claimed that he

had been at his "uncle" Montoya or Martinez's house, which,
Officer Stuck testified, he later recanted when it was discovered
to be untrue (R. 213 at 36). Third, defendant claimed that he
had walked past the Redwood Road Pizza Hut just before he was
stopped by Officer Stuck.

Yet, he claimed, he saw nothing

unusual going on, except that he may have heard a fight (R. 212
at 242). Judging from the distance between where defemdant was
stopped and the location of Pizza Hut (two to three blocks away),
it was very likely that the police had already arrived at the
Pizza Hut, or, at a minimum, the robbery was taking or had just
taken place at the time defendant claims that he was walking
through the parking lot.

Fourth, defendant implied that Officer

Stuck committed gross misconduct.

Defendant not only claimed

conduct amounting to false imprisonment at the time of the
initial stop, but also claimed that Officer Stuck was "pissed
off" and physically threatened him on a number of occasions (R.
212 at 232, 234, 239). No other evidence corroborated this
allegation by defendant, including the testimony of Officer
Rackley, whom defendant claimed was present on at least one
occasion when he was physically threatened (R. 212 at 236-37 and
248-50).

Fifth, defendant testified that when he was taken to

his "uncle's" house to corroborate his story, and when he found
Defendant also claimed the other individual was not wearing a
shirt (R. 215 at 21), although this was also in direct
contradiction with Officer Stuck's observation that the man was
wearino a liaht colored flhirt (R.

212 at 17R-17Q\.

out his "uncle" denied that defendant had been there, he
specifically requested to talk to the "uncle" (R. 212 at 239).
The jury may have found such a request strange, since defendant
denied having actually met his "uncle" when he had visited the
house, and there was no need to speak to his "uncle" to
corroborate his story (R. 212 at 234).
The trial court and the jury, after seeing the demeanor
of the each witness and reviewing defendant's claims, could have
reasonably dismissed his testimony as unreliable.

Therefore,

rejecting the allegations by defendant and accepting the
testimony of Officer Stuck, there was no detention and no
"seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes at the initial stop.
Under this Court's decision in Dietman, and specifically the
first level of acceptable constitutional conduct delineated in
Kerritt, the stop was proper with or without reasonable suspicion
as merely a voluntary police/citizen encounter.
However, should this Court determine that there was a
detention requiring reasonable suspicion, or find for some other
reason a showing of reasonable suspicion was necessary, Officer
Stuck articulated sufficient circumstances to warrant an
investigatory stop.
B.

Reasonable Suspicion

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982), provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his

name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
g
In accordance with § 77-7-15,

this Court has held that "[t]hough

there may be no probable cause to make an arrest, a police
officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for investigating possible criminal
behavior." State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 105 (Utah 1980).
Further, this Court has said:
When a police officer sees or hears conduct
which gives rise to suspicion of crime, he
has not only the right but the duty to make
observations and investigations to determine
whether the law is being violated: and if so,
to take such measures as are necessary in the
enforcement of the law.
State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977), cert, denied,
Folkes v. Utah, 434 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 523, 54 L.Ed.2d 461
(1977).
The United States Supreme Court in Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) indicated "[a]
brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while
obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of
the facts known to the officer at the time." J^ci. at 146
(citations omitted).

The stop and questioning is an

With regard to the foregoing argument on police/citizen
encounters, it appears that this Court has accepted non-detention
voluntary police encounters without reasonable suspicion in spite
of S 77-7-15. See State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987);
see also Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah App.
1987). In Dietman, this Court specifically rejected the holdings
in State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), and State v.
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986) as inapplicable because the
defendants in those cases were stopped, detained, and searched
without their consent.

"intermediate response" so that a police officer "who lacks . . .
probable cause to arrest [need not] shrug his shoulders and allow
a crime to occur or a criminal to escape." J^i. at 145.
State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973).

See also
Law

enforcement officers must be able to approach a person for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest. See United States
/. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110
(1983); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) .
In the present case, the initial stop by Officer Stuck
was valid.

As illustrated by the following facts, Officer Stuck

clearly had reasonable suspicion justifying a brief investigatory
stop.
On August 13, 1987, shortly after 1:00 a.m., Officer
Stuck was cruising in his patrol car with the headlights and
radio off, searching for a runaway juvenile (R. 212 at 151-152,
R. 213 at 9). As he drove down a side-street in a residential
neighborhood, he observed two individuals walking southbound down
the sidewalk, side by side, toward him.

Officer Stuck continued

to watch the individuals proceed together for approximately half
a block (R. 212 at 153, R. 213 at 7). Suddenly, at a point where
Officer Stuck believed the individuals recognized his police
cruiser, one of the men took off running (R. 212 at 178-179).
Officer Stuck then drove to where the remaining individual was
standing, exited his patrol car and asked the individual if he
had any identification, and an explanation as to why the other

person ran (R. 212 at 156). Officer Stuck testified that the
specific reason he had stopped and questioned defendant was "the
fact that [defendant] had been with another man who ran from me,
and at 1:00 o'clock in the morning in an area that had a very
high incidence of nighttime residential burglary and car prowls;"
additionally, he had "taken several car prowl reports" during
9
that week from nearby apartment buildings (R. 213 at 8-9).
It may be that none of the above factors alone would be
sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion; nonetheless, the
factors when combined are sufficient.

First, this Court, while

holding that flight alone upon the presence of a law enforcement
officer "in the abstract is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause for arrest," it is nonetheless one factor which may be
included in making a determination of whether probable cause for
an arrest exists.
1981).

State v. Elliot, 626 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah

In People v. Johnson, 691 P.2d 751 (Colo. App. 1984), the

court, in determining whether a law enforcement officer had
reasonable suspicion to warrant an investigative stop, stated,
"defendant and a confederate were running bent down like
'football players carrying a football.' As the United States
Supreme Court observed . . . 'deliberately furtive actions and
flight at the approach of . . . law officers are strong indicia
of mens rea.'" ^d. at 753/ citing Sibron v. New Yorkf 392 U.S.
In his brief, defendant failed to indicate all the reasons set
forth above as to why Officer Stuck made the initial stop, merely
stating, "[o]n Officer Stuck's own admission, Mr. Ramirez had not
done anything to arouse suspicion other than be in the
neighborhood at one o'clock in the morning" (Brief of Appellant
[hereinafter Br. of App.] at 15).

40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1912, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); see also People
v. Perez, 690 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1984).

Second, this Court has

found that the lateness of the hour and the high crime rate of a
specific area are also important factors which can be considered
when determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.

In State

v. Ballenberqer, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982), this Court held that
law enforcement officers were justified in making an
investigatory stop, knowing,
the lateness of the hour, the suspicious
movements of the defendant and his companion,
and the fact that the officers had been
advised of the high rate of burglaries in the
area, together with the unobstructed view of
the C.B. equipment.
Id. at 929.
Finally, the intrusion in this case was minimal. As
testified by Officer Stuck at trial, defendant, at the time of
the initial stop, was not arrested, handcuffed, moved, or treated
in any improper manner, but merely questioned.

Therefore, the

investigatory stop was supported by sufficient reasonable
suspicion and was not in violation of § 77-7-15 or defendant's
constitutional rights.
POINT II
MR. WILSON'S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT WAS
THE RESULT OF A CLEAR AND CONSCIENTIOUS
OBSERVATION OF DEFENDANT, AND WAS NOT THE
PRODUCT OF ANY IMPROPER INFLUENCE OR
UNNECESSARY SUGGESTION.
Defendant contends that the eyewitness testimony of
Gerald Wilson should have been suppressed "inasmuch as that
identification of [defendant] was the product of unconstitutional
suggestive showup procedures'1 (Br. of App. at 18-19).

Of the three victim/witnesses, Mr. Wilson was the only
individual who sufficiently observed defendant at the scene of
the robbery to later positively identify him as one of the
robbers.

Therefore, it is only the evidence which would tend to

show whether or not Mr. Wilson's personal identification of
defendant was the result of improper suggestiveness that is
relevant to this issue.

Defendant alleges two instances where

the police conduct was impermissibly suggestive in violation of
defendant's constitutional rights.

First, when police were about

to escort Mr. Wilson to identify defendant, Mr. Wilson testified
•' [t]he police officer told me 'I've found a man that fit one of
the descriptions.
50).

Can you come and identify him?" (R. 213 at

Second, when Mr. Wilson identified defendant, he

(defendant) was presented handcuffed behind his back and to a
fence, and guarded by police officers.
A brief review of the applicable law regarding
identification, and improper "suggestiveness", shows that
defendant's contention lacks merit.
The United States Supreme Court set forth the modern
rule concerning out-of-court identifications as relating to due
process in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18
L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).
times.

In that case, a man stabbed a woman eleven

The defendant was taken to a hospital where the victim

Defendant supports his argument on this point by alleging a
separate improper police suggestion made to another witness, Mr.
Davis, prior to Mr. Davis' attempt to identify defendant. Any
allegedly improper suggestion made to any other witness, which
Mr. Wilson did not have knowledge of, is irrelevant to this
issue.

had undergone surgery.

There, with the defendant handcuffed and

surrounded by five police officers, an identification was made.
The Court in upholding the conviction stated the basis on which
due process violation claims were to be decided, "a claimed
violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation
depends upon the totality of circumstances surrounding it. . ."
Id. at 302.

In Stovall, the Supreme Court enunciated the steps

to be followed in ascertaining whether or not a due process
violation claim is valid:

(1) the "totality of the

circumstances" must be considered; (2) in viewing the
identification procedures in light of the totality of the
circumstances, were they "unnecessarily suggestive"; (3) if the
procedures are found to be unnecessarily suggestive in light of
the totality of circumstances, were they s<o unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive as to cause "irreparable mistaken"
identification,

^d. at 302.

Later, in Neil v. Bigqers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375,
34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), the United States Supreme Court again
addressed the subject of identification procedures.
been raped.

A woman had

She had been able to view her assailant for a

considerable amount of time, but could only give police a
"general description" of him.

She was thereafter shown several

photographs (thirty to forty) and picked out a man as having
features similar to those of her assailant, but positively
identified none of the suspects. Approximately seven months
after the commission of the crime, the victim was brought to the
police station to view the defendant, who was being held on

another charge.

Unable to conduct a lineup due to the inability

to locate persons who fit the defendant's unusual description, a
showup was conducted at which time the defendant was told to
repeat the words "shut up or I'll kill you."

The defendant was

identified as the assailant and was subsequently convicted.

On

appeal, defendant claimed that his identification and the
circumstances surrounding it failed to comport with due process
requirements.
In rejecting the defendant's misidentification claim,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rules set forth in Stovall.

The

Court also said that the unnecessary suggestions in the
identification procedures followed in that case did not in and of
themselves require the exclusion of evidence.

Instead, the Court

declared that the "central question" to be answered was "whether
under the 'totality of circumstances' the identification was
reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive."
409 U.S. at 199.

The Court then enumerated "factors to be

considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification":
. . . the opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of
the witness' prior description of the
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness at the confrontation, and the
length of time between the crime and the
confrontation . . .
Id. at 199, 200.
Following Biggers, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the
five factor analysis.

See State v. Newton, 657 P.2d 759 (Utah

1983); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982); and State v.
Wullfenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982), cert, denied Wullfenstein

v, Utah, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1443, 75 L.Ed.2d 799 (1983).
This Court has recently in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah
1986), criticized several of the factors in the Biggers test;
nonetheless, whether this Court examines this issue under the
Biggers test, or under the pre-Biggers test set forth in State v.
Perry,

the identification procedure used in this case was

entirely proper.
This Court has stated on a number of occasions that the
Court "will not disturb the trial court's resolution of the
factual issues underlying its decision to grant or deny [a]
motion to suppress absent clear error." State v. Bullock, 6S9
P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1985), citing State v. Tuttle, 674 P.2d 125
(Utah 1983) (while this is the citation given by the court in
Bullock, it is clearly erroneous; it appears that the case being
cited is found at 399 P.2d 580 (Utah 1965); and State v. Cole,
674 P.2d 119, 122, 125 (Utah 1983).
Reviewing the two alleged circumstances of improper
suggestion, with the understanding that M[w]here an

In State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972), this
Court stated:
the circumstances of the individual case
should be scrutinized carefully by the trial
court to see whether in the identification
procedure there was anything done which
should be regarded as so suggestive and
persuasive that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the identification was not a
genuine product of the knowledge and
recollection of the witness, but was
something so distorted or tainted that in
fairness an accused should not be allowed to
be tested thereby.

identification procedure, even though suggestive, does not give
rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification, no due
process violation has occurred," State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353,
357 (Utah 1980), reveals that each is without merit.
First, the officer's statement to defendant, "I've
found a man that fit one of the descriptions . • . [cjan you come
and identify him?'", was nothing more than a simple request,
which clearly did not improperly suggest that the suspect was
actually involved in the robbery.

Evidence at trial showed

(contrary to any assertion by defendant) that the description
given by Mr. Wilson prior to identifying defendant virtually
matched the general description of defendant including his
weight, height and clothing.

Further, defendant stood by his

description and subsequent identification, never once indicating
that he could have been mistaken.

Finally, when Mr. Wilson

identified defendant he specifically stated "[t]hat was the man
with the gun", although it is clear such was never "suggested" to
the witness. (R. 213 at 51).
Second, the reason defendant was handcuffed to the
fence and surrounded by law enforcement officers was purely for
security reasons (R. 212 at 204). The identification was made in
a residential neighborhood, and the police had probable cause to
believe that defendant had committed aggravated robbery with use
of a deadly weapon; a deadly weapon which had not been found.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record which would
indicate that the officer's actions were unusual or otherwise
different from ordinary police procedure.

Furthermore, Mr.

Wilson specifically testified that at the time of the
identification he did not know defendant was even handcuffed (R.
212 at 94).
Finally, defendant attempts to attack the credibility
of Mr. Wilson's identification testimony through alleged
discrepancies in the description given to the officers and/or his
incapacity to adequately view the defendant at the time of the
robbery.

This Court has held on several occasions:
The issues of the distance between the
witness and the individual, the discrepancies
in descriptions, and the time between the
incident and the identification go to the
credibility of the witness which is best
determined by the fact finder.

State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983).

The foregoing

is true even where unnecessarily suggestive circumstances were
claimed.

See Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1361-1362; State v. Marsh, 682

P.2d 1329 (Utah 1982); State v. Wullfenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah
1982); and State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1983).

There

were no unnecessarily suggestive circumstances and, even if there
were, they did not rise to the level sufficient to show a
constitutional violation of due process. 12

12
While the State acknowledges there may be drawbacks to
using showups as opposed to using lineups, showups do provide a
very important function. Showups allow an immediate
identification following the commission of a crime, which
improves the accuracy of the witness identification, as well
minimizing the intrusion on members of the public. It is far
less intrusive to temporarily detain someone for an immediate
identification, where the individual can be freed if not
identified, rather than taking the individual into custody and
organizing a lineup (which may take a substantial amount of

POINT III
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS DURING OPENING
STATEMENT AND CLOSING ARGUMENT WERE NOT
IMPROPER AND DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT HIS
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. FURTHER, NO
CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION WAS MADE DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT TO PRESERVE THAT ISSUE FOR
APPEAL,
Defendant contends that the prosecutor made four
improper comments at trial, one during opening statement and
three during closing argument, which prejudiced him and denied
him a fair trial.

The State separately addresses the comments

made during closing argument from the comment made during opening
statement.
As defendant concedes, defense "counsel did not
contemporaneously object to . . . [the] comments of the
prosecutor during closing argument" (Br. of App. at 35), but
raised this issue for the first time in a motion for new trial.
A review of the Utah Rules of Evidence, case law, and
the record in this case demonstrates that defendant is not
entitled to raise this issue on appeal.

Rule 103(a) of the Utah

Rules of Evidence makes it clear that the person complaining of
an evidentiary ruling must make a timely objection on the record,
stating the specific grounds for objection.

While this rule does

not specifically address closing arguments, the same general rule
pertains to arguments. See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561
(Utah 1987).
This Court has long held that a timely objection must
be interposed when improper statements are made.

In State v.

White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978), this Court stated:

If counsel desires to object and preserve his
record as to such an error during argument,
he must call it to the attention of the trial
court so that if he thinks that it is
necessary and appropriate to do so, he will
have an opportunity to rectify any error or
impropriety therein and thus obviate the
necessity of an entire new trial.
Id. at 555.

Recently this Court reiterated this requirement in

Tillman when it stated:
Indeed, it is the rule that if improper
statements are made by counsel during a trial
it is the duty of opposing counsel to
register a contemporaneous objection thereto
so that the court may make a correction by
proper instruction and if the offense is
sufficiently prejudicial, declare a mistrial.
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561.
Because defendant failed to object to the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, this Court can only address the issue
if it finds "plain error" under Rule 103. This Court addressed
that option in State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676 (Utah 1982).

The

defendant in that case had been required to try on shoes which
had been left at a burglary scene.
but the issue was appealed.

Her counsel had not objected

This Court stated:

Under the particular circumstances of this
case, it appears that defendant had waived
any constitutional objections. Not having
objected to the demonstration at the trial
court level, she is precluded from doing so
for the first time on appeal.
Furthermore, the facts are not such that
great and manifest injustice would be done if
this Court does not entertain the issues sua
sponte as an exception. This can be done in
rare cases under Rule 4 (now Rule 103[d]) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence, or under such
exceptions as this Court considers of
momentous concern in protecting
constitutional rights previously waived.
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246

(1970); State v. Cabo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d
952 (1936).
Id. at 677.
In order for the Court to address an issue of this type
on appeal, it looks to the egregiousness of the alleged
misconduct and whether there would be a "great and manifest
injustice" done if the Court did not address the issue. See State
v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988).

The conduct complained of in

the present case, as set forth below, does not rise to a level
requiring this Court to depart from the established rule of
requiring objections at trial.

The conduct was neither improper

nor did it influence the jury to defendant's detriment.
The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the limited
circumstances where improper remarks by counsel may be grounds
for reversal.

The Court in State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513

P.2d 422 (Utah 1973) indicated:
The test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, [1] did the
remark call to the attention of the jurors
matters which they would not have been
justified in considering in determining there
verdict, and [2] where they under the
circumstances of the particular case probably
influenced by those remarks.
Id. at 426.

See also State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah 1986);

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984); and West Valley City v.
Rislow, 736 P.2d 637 (Utah App. 1987).
In the instant case, the comments during the
prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument neither
M

call[ed] to the attention of the jurors matters which they would

not be justified in considering" nor did any comment improperly

A.

Closing Argument

The following two comments, defendant contends,
"purposefully incited the jury to react to the high crime rate
experienced in this and other communities across the nation,
urging them to react emotionally in responding to their duties as
jurors" (Br. of App. at 35):
Wouldn't it be nice if on all Pizza Huts
and all other institutions there would be a
camera mounted out there in a parking lot
that could view everything; and then we could
come to court and we could play back that
camera video and see what happened . . .
Perhaps you would see, as Livio Ramirez
held that gun directly at Gerry Wilson, ten
feet away for about one minute and then maybe
we could begin to appreciate and we could
begin to understand and we could begin to
realize, the reality of the crime. What it
meant to be a victim of a violent crime.
Maybe we could begin to appreciate the
fright, the pain and loss, and the
humiliation that went along with being a
victim of a crime. But of course, we don't
have cameras like that. But you know that
doesn't stop us from apprehending and
prosecuting people who commit such crimes.
Just doesn't stop us. All across America
today there are juries just like this with
juror just like you, who have to make
decisions, not based upon cameras, but based
upon the testimony of witnesses, people who
are actually there, people who saw it with
their own eyes, people who experienced it and
who come in under oath and testify as to what
happened.
I think here, we even got from the
testimony, a little bit of appreciation of
what went on; a little bit of appreciation of
what it feels like when you're a victim of
the crime. Remember when Kathy Davis
testified and talked about what went on?
Remember those tears that came to her eye as
she was reliving the fright, and the danger
and the pain and the violation of her safety?
(R. 216 at 4-6)

The judge told you that how we choose
juries is kind of an awkward situation.
Mainly, you're not chosen, but you're kind of
what's left over. Hate to tell you that, but
that's what you are. I think we got some
good people. If I had the chance to just go
out and pick the jury, I want you and you. I
tell you what I would look for. I would
really look for people who live in my
community and who are concerned about what
goes on; concerned about the court system and
would like to be involved. I hope you are
those kind of people, because you know, I can
come here the judge can come here the defense
attorney could come here, and all the
witnesses could come and do our job. But in
the final sentence what you do, determines
the success of this particular case.
(R. 236 at 19-20).
These comments were not improper, much less
prejudicial.

The prosecutor in these statements merely commented

on what evidence had already been brought forth during trial, and
merely commented upon the jury's important role as trier of fact
to see that the legal system operates properly.

The prosecutor's

comment on the evidence may have highlighted the emotional impact
the crime had upon the victims but under, the circumstances, the
comment was proper.

One of the elements the State was required

to prove for Aggravated Robbery is the taking of personal
property "accomplished by means of force or fear".
Code Ann. S§ 76-6-301 and 76-6-302 (1982).

See Utah

The purpose of

evidencing the impact of the crime at trial, and subsequently
commenting on that impact during closing argument, was to prove
and properly comment on an essential element of the crime
charged.

The comment was not improper and the defendant was not

prejudiced.

The trial court properly recognized in denying

defendant's motion for new trial, Mthe cumulative effect of all

the claimed irregularities in the argument by the prosecutor were
not such that any jury would have been mislead [sic] nor inflamed
in such manner that a miscarriage of justice occurred herein" (R.
at 173).
In the remaining comment made during closing argument
which defendant contends was improper, the prosecutor commented
briefly on the burden of proof, stating:
A reasonable doubt must be a real
substantial doubt and not one that's merely
possible or imaginary.
From that, I want to say two things. First
of all the burden of proof is not beyond any
doubt. If it was beyond any doubt, we
couldn't ever prove anything could we. Just
beyond a reasonable doubt. And as you read
the last sentence, before you as a Jury could
come back with a not guilty verdict, you
would have to find a reasonable doubt, based
upon the evidence or lack thereof and not
just a doubt that's possible or imaginary.
(R. 216 at 3). Defendant concedes that this is not a
misstatement of the law.

Although the statement is less than

clear, it does not "realistically shift the burden from the State
. . . to the defendant", as defendant claims.

In addition, as

the trial court noted in its denial for new trial, "[t]he
definition of reasonable doubt was read to the jury by the Court
during the course of the trial at least two times . . . [i]n []
addition the standard reasonable doubt instruction was given to
the jury in written form which the jury had in the jury room" (R.
at 173)*

Furthermore, the jury was specifically instructed on

Jury Instruction 7 provided:
I have told you that the burden is upon the
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Now, by reasonable doubt

at least two occasions that comments by counsel were not
evidence.

Accordingly, the prosecutor's comments were not only

proper, but any confusion they may have generated was not
prejudicial in light of the proper instruction to the jury.
B.

Opening Statement

Defendant's final contention concerns what appears to
be the following comment (defendant does not cite to any specific
comment) made by the prosecutor during opening statement:
Mr. Ramirez was arrested, and consequently
they asked him about where he had been. He
gave an address and claimed an uncle of his,
he had been to and went over to the place, to
this uncle, and inquired as to whether or not
Mr. Ramirez had been there, and the uncle
said no, he hadn't been there.
Then Mr. Ramirez changed his story and said
no, I've been out preparing for jogging. I
need to get in shape so I was out walking
around that evening.
(R. 212 at 18-19).

Defendant objected to this comment, in an off

the record discussion (R. 212 at 19), contending that what the
"uncle" said had earlier been determined to be hearsay.
Defendant also moved for a mistrial, which motion was also
renewed later in trial.

The trial court, in denying defendant's

motion, stated,

Cont. is meant a doubt that it based on
reason and one which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies
the mind and convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which
reasonable men and women would entertain, and
it must arise from the evidence in this case.
(R. at 135). See also Jury Instructions 3 and 15 (R. at 132,
143-146).

while I agree that it was unfortunate and
probably improper to put into articulated
words, the language supposedly attributable
to the alleged uncle in the opening
statement; nevertheless, I don't believe that
it created reversible error, not do I think
it was prejudicial or by reason of fact that
the Court had previously instructed rather
lengthily the jury, that the statements of
counsel are not evidence but simply
statements of counsel.
(R. 212 at 215).
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Workman, 635 P.2d
49 (Utah 1981), stated:
[T]he [trial] court has broad discretion in
determining whether a mistrial should be
declared, and a denial of a motion for
mistrial does not constitute an abuse of
discretion where no prejudice to the accused
is shown. The matter is not dissimilar to
that of granting or refusing to grant a new
trial. Such lies within the sound discretion
of the trial judge and this Court will not
reverse his decision thereon in the absence
of an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted).
The denial of mistrial due to the prosecutor's comment,
was entirely proper, as the comment clearly failed to meet either
of the two requirements set forth in Valdez, 513 P.2d 422.
Furthermore, the prosecutor's comment was supported by evidence
which was eventually brought out at trial by both Officer Stuck
and by the defendant himself (R. 212 at 71, 248-49 ) . 1 4

The Court

allowed the following examination of Officer Stuck:
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It appears under Rule 801 of the Utah Rules of Evidence that
the only part of the prosecutor's comments which could have been
considered hearsay was when he indicated the uncle said "no".
Since this statement was not "offered to prove the matter
asserted", but was used only to show defendant had changed his
story, it was not hearsay.

Q (By Mr. Stott) Officer Stuck, I
believe we were at a point where you had
taken the defendant to an address that had
pointed out to you; it that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q And you had gone and talked with
somebody at that address, is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q And then you came back and talked
with the defendant, is that correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

What did you tell him at that time?

A I told the defendant his story did
not pan out.
(R. 212 at 71). The following discussion later took place on
cross-examination of defendant:
Q Then you took the officer to where
your uncle was, is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

And Uncle Joe Ortega?

A

Yes.

Q And then went in, came back out, and
what did they tell you when they came back
out—Officer Stuck?
A He told me that, "I pissed him off,
and that I did it now." And said, "That you
don't want me to piss you off", or "You don't
want to piss me off." And just kept on
threatening me.
Q And you said on direct examination
that Officer Stuck said that your uncle said
you hadn't been there?
A

Yes.

Q

And what did Officer Stuck say?

A

Uh—he kept calling me a liar.

Q Did he say anything else about what
you uncle had said?
A Says that I haven't been for a couple
of days.
Q Said that your uncle said you hadn't
been there for a couple of days?
A

That he hadn't seen me.

(R. 212 at 248-249).
Even if it is determined that the prosecutor "call[ed]
to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be
justified in determining their verdict" (i.e. hearsay), the
subsequent valid trial testimony by Officer Stuck and defendant
mitigated any prejudicial effect that the comment may have had,
whereby the jury was not improperly influenced.

See Rule 30,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30
(1982) ("any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded").

POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT DEFENDANT
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient
to convict him of Aggravated Robbery.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated the
standard of review on appeal when the argument concerns
sufficiency of the evidence.
to the jury verdict.

The Court accords great deference

It is the exclusive function of the jury to

weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the
witnesses.

"[T]he 'Court should only interfere when . . .

reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt.'"

State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah

App. 1987), quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980);
Furthermore, defendant has the burden of establishing "'that the
evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime.'"

State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah

1985), quoting State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980);
see also State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981).
All of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
from the evidence should be reviewed in a light most favorable to
the jury verdict.

When the evidence is so viewed, the Court

reverses only when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt concerning defendant's guilt.

See State v. One

1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392, 393 (Utah App. 1987),
citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985); see also State
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983)/ superseded in the context of
bench trials by statute or rule, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191
(Utah 1987).

The Court has succinctly stated that, unless there

is a clear showing of a lack of evidence, the jury verdict will
be upheld.

See Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412; see also State v.

Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah 1977).
The statutory requirements of Robbery and Aggravated
Robbery, as provided by Utah Code Ann. SS 76-6-301 and 76-6-302

Robbery.--(1) Robbery is the unlawful and
intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.
Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person commits
aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or
a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
Defendant's lone contention is that the evidence was
insufficient "as to the identification of the perpetrators" of
the Aggravated Robbery.

In alleging that the evidence was

insufficient, defendant attempts to discredit the eyewitness
testimony of Mr. Wilson (and eyewitnesses in general) as
inherently unreliable.

As indicated in Point II, the credibility

of the witness, and specifically a witness' ability to perceive
and identify, are factual questions necessarily determined by the
trier of fact.

In the present case, the jury was correctly

instructed as to how to judge and weigh eyewitness testimony (R.
at 143-46, 136, and 140).
The evidence in this case was clearly sufficient to
identify defendant as one of the robbers.

Mr. Wilson, as a

victim and eyewitness, personally identified defendant shortly
after the robbery and again at trial as the robber holding the
gun (R. 212 at 91, 94). Although defendant claims this
identification was the result of improper "suggestion", such
claim is without merit as set out in Point II.

Further, the

description given to police by Mr* Wilson prior to the showup

virtually matched defendant, including his height, weight and
clothing.

Along with the eyewitness identification by Mr.

Wilson, there was substantial other evidence connecting defendant
with the robbery:

(1) All three witness/victims identified the

clothing worn by defendant as similar to or the same as the
clothing worn by one of the robbers during the robbery (R. 212 at
37, 66, 94-95);

(2) Mr. Davis' description of the gun robber

virtually matched the description of defendant (R. 212 at 195, R.
215 at 4-6); (3) Defendant was stopped minutes after the robbery
only two to three blocks away from the scene of the robbery and
only a block or so from where the deposit bag was discovered (R.
212 at 140-150, R. 211 at 8). Defendant also claimed that he had
just walked past the Pizza Hut but had not noticed any police
cars or anything unusual, other than possibly a fight (R. 212 at
242); and (4) defendant, when he was initially stopped, lied to
the police as to where he had been, and whether he had been with
the other man who had fled.

He also subsequently changed his

story as to where he had been when his first story was found to
be false (R. 213 at 11, 36). The evidence was sufficient to
sustain the conviction of defendant.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the jury's verdict of conviction
in this case.
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